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i I 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal from a final order of the District Court of 
the Second Judicial District denying Appellant Christine Barrus 
(hereinafter "Barrus") relief, following de novo review of an 
informal adjudicative proceeding before the State of Utah, 
Department of Human Services. The Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annot. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1953), 
as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the court erred in not finding that Barrus' 
caseworker made a representation regarding Barrus' eligibility for 
AFDC upon which Barrus relied to her detriment. R-273. 
2. Whether the district court erred in failing to apply the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel so as to estop the State of Utah, 
Department of Human Services from declaring Barrus ineligible for 
AFDC benefits. R-193. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Challenges to findings of fact require the appellant to 
marshall the evidence in support of the findings and to demonstrate 
why the evidence is insufficient or why the contested finding is 
clearly against the weight of the evidence. Trolley Square 
Associates v. Nelson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App. 1994). The 
application of the facts to the legal standard of equitable 
estoppel is a mixed question of fact and law. Since equitable 
estoppel is a highly fact dependent question, the trial court's 
application of equitable estoppel will not be overturned absent an 
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abuse of discretion. Trolley Square. 886 P.2d at 65; State of Utah 
v. Irizarrv, 893 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah App. 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
 # 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17)(1991 ed. and Supp.) 
Utah-DHS-OFS Vol. II §§ 122 and 438 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
This case began at the administrative level when Barrus 
received a notice from her caseworker, Shannon Freestone 
(hereinafter "Freestone") of the Ogden Office of Family Support 
(OFS), dated July 6, 1994, advising that her financial and medical 
assistance case would be closed July 31, 1994. Record (hereinafter 
"R"), at 168. Barrus had been receiving Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid for herself and her 
stepchildren. The notice advised that her case would remain closed 
through August 31, 1994, because she had received a lump sum 
payment of $2226.00 in June 1994, placing her over the income limit 
for a household of her size. R-168. 
Barrus requested a hearing on July 8, 1994. R-171. A hearing 
in Barrus' case was held August 14, 1994 before Hearing Officer 
Neal Bernson. R-6. At the hearing, it was established that the 
lump sum was retroactive Social Security benefits which Barrus 
received in June 1994. R-6. The state applied its policies at 
Volume II S 438 to disqualify Barrus and her family. That section 
of the AFDC policies disqualifies participating families who 
2 
receive a nonrecurring payment of income which exceeds the standard 
needs amount for the household. R-6-10. Barrus testified she had 
reported to her caseworker in May 1994 that she had been found 
disabled and had given her a copy of the favorable decision. R-ll. 
She argued that her caseworker had failed to advise her that 
receipt of a lump sum would disqualify her and that she had relied 
on her caseworker to inform her. She argued that the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel should be applied to prevent her case from being 
closed. R-ll. In a decision dated November 4, 1994, the hearing 
officer denied Barrus the relief she requested. R-5. Barrus then 
filed her complaint in the district court, seeking review of the 
informal adjudicative proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Annot. § 
63-46b-15. 
B. Course Of The Proceedings 
Upon completion of discovery, a trial de novo was held in the 
district court on January 23, 1996 before the Honorable Stanton M. 
Taylor. The parties presented evidence and trial memoranda. On 
February 8, 1996, Judge Taylor issued a memorandum decision denying 
Barrus relief from the informal adjudicative proceeding. This 
appeal followed. 
C. Disposition At Trial Court Or Agency 
The relief requested pursuant to Utah Code Annot. § 63-46b-15 
(1991) was denied. 
D. Relevant Facts With Citations To The Record 
In January 1994, Barrus applied for financial and medical 
assistance at the Ogden Office of Family Support (OFS). R-202, 
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229. In April 1994, Barrus was receiving AFDC benefits and 
Medicaid for herself and four stepchildren. R-197. At the same 
time, she had pending applications for Social Security Disability 
Insurance (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).1 When she 
applied for disability, Barrus did not understand the difference 
between the two programs. R-198. Barrus suffers from lupus 
erythematosus which, in addition to physical symptoms, affects her 
intellectual functioning. R-199. 
Barrus' caseworker was Shannon Freestone. R-201. She has a 
bachelor's degree and two years of graduate school. R-239. At the 
time of trial she had been employed by OFS for two and one-half 
years. R-228. She had received intensive training during her 
first six months and continual training thereafter. R-228-29. 
Freestone was familiar with the lump sum policy contained in Vol. 
II § 438. R-172. She was "generally given training on lump sums 
about once a year, plus it's mentioned informally in other 
trainings." R-229. The essence of Freestone's training as to lump 
sums was "not to tell the clients to spend their money." R-244. 
The policy and practice at OFS allows a worker to consult with 
a more experienced worker when the correct application of a policy 
is not known. R-242. From January 1994 through July 1994, 
Freestone knew that if the lump sum Barrus would receive was SSI 
benefits, it would not affect her family's AFDC and Medicaid 
Recipients and others sometimes refer to the Disability 
Insurance Program as "SSA" to distinguish it from Supplemental 
Security Income "SSI." Since SSA is also the acronym for the 
Social Security Administration, the Disability Insurance Program 
will be referred to herein as DIB. 
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eligibility but if the lump sum were DIB benefits, eligibility 
would be affected. R-244-46. Freestone never discussed with 
Barrus how receipt of a DIB lump sum would affect her family's 
eligibility (R-246-47), although there is no policy that would 
prevent a caseworker from explaining to an AFDC recipient how SSI 
and DIB lump sums affect eligibility. R-246-47. Freestone could 
have told Barrus not to spend any lump sum she received until it 
was determined how her children's eligibility would be affected, 
but she did not do so. R-248. Had Barrus told Freestone that she 
was receiving a $10,000.00 inheritance next month, her caseworker 
would have advised her how such a lump sum would affect her future 
eligibility. R-248. Part of a caseworker's duty is to determine 
eligibility. R-249. Freestone did not determine Barrus' future 
eligibility until after the lump sum had been received and spent. 
R-249. 
When she applied for assistance in January 1994, Barrus 
indicated on her application that she had applied for Social 
Security and gave her caseworker copies of both her DIB and SSI 
applications. R-201-02, 230. A hearing on Barrus' disability 
claim was held April 6, 1994 before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
Rand Farrer. R-164, 167. Barrus' representative advised Shannon 
Freestone in a letter dated April 25, 1994 of the hearing and that, 
"[w]e were told by Judge Farrer that he would be awarding benefits 
in her favor." R-164. Shannon Freestone has admitted receiving 
the letter. R-231. 
In a Notice of Decision, dated May 24, 1996, Barrus was 
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advised by SSA that she had been found disabled. R-165. On May 
26, 1994, Barrus delivered a copy of her favorable disability 
decision to her caseworker who date-stamped the document and placed 
it in her file. R-165, 231-32. The Notice of Decision provides, 
in part: 
DECISION 
Based on the Title II application filed on May 14, 1993, 
the claimant is entitled to a period of disability 
commencing February 15, 1993, and to disability insurance 
benefits under sections 216(i) and 223 of the Social 
Security Act, respectively, and the claimant's disability 
has continued through the date of this decision. 
It is the further decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge that based on the Title XVI application filed on 
May 14, 1993, the claimant has been disabled since 
February 15, 1993, under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the 
Social Security Act, and the claimant's disability has 
continued through the date of this decision. 
R-166. When she read the Notice of Decision, Barrus did not 
understand the difference between DIB and SSI. R-207. Sometime 
after delivering a copy of the Notice of Decision to Shannon 
Freestone, Barrus met with her to discuss the disability 
determination. R-209. Following the meeting with her caseworker, 
Barrus did not understand the difference between DIB and SSI, nor 
did she understand that the receipt of a DIB lump sum would 
disqualify her children from AFDC and Medicaid for a period of 
time. R-210-12. On June 28, 1994, Barrus delivered to her 
caseworker a copy of a notice from SSA, dated June 23, 1994 (R-75, 
233), which stated, in relevant part: 
In an earlier letter, we told you we were 
holding back your Social Security benefits for 
August 1993 through May 1994. We did this 
because we thought we might have to reduce 
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your Social Security benefits if you also got 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) money for 
any of those months. 
Now we're writing to let you know that we're 
sending you the money we held back. This is 
because you didn't get SSI money for August 
1993 through May 1994. 
You'll get a check soon for $2,226.00, the 
amount you're due for August 1993 through May 
1994. 
About July 03, 1994, you'll get your regular 
monthly Social Security check for $225.00. 
R-169. Toward the end of June 1994, Barrus received $2226.00 as a 
lump svim payment of retroactive DIB benefits which she spent on 
family necessities. R-213-15. On June 28, 1994, Freestone 
contacted the Social Security Administration to determine the type 
of benefits Barrus would be receiving and was advised that it would 
be DIB. R-72. On June 30, 1994, Shannon Freestone sent Barrus a 
notice requesting additional information: 
CHRISTINE, THANKS FOR TURNING IN YOUR SOCIAL 
SECURITY INFORMATION. THERE ARE A FEW MORE 
DETAILS I NEED TO KNOW THAT WEREN'T ADDRESSED 
IN THE AWARD NOTICE. 
PLEASE CONTACT ME CONCERNING WHEN YOU WILL BE 
RECEIVING THE $2226 AND HOW MUCH OF THAT 
AMOUNT YOU WILL ACTUALLY RECEIVE. I CAN BE 
REACHED AT 626-3376. 
R-170, 235-36. When Barrus responded to her caseworker's request, 
she had already spent all of the lump sum except approximately 
$200. R-236. 
In a decision, dated July 6, 1994, Barrus was informed by her 
caseworker that her case would be closed from June 1, 1994 through 
August 31, 1994, because of the lump sum she received in June. R-
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168. Barrus requested a hearing and received continued benefits 
while her case was pending. R-218. The hearing officer who heard 
her case denied relief and an overpayment was assessed for the 
three months in question. R-218. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A representation was made to Barrus by her caseworker's 
silence, when she should have informed her that receipt of a DIB 
lump sum would render her children ineligible for several months 
from receiving AFDC and medical benefits. Barrus provided her 
caseworker with timely and accurate information regarding her 
disability application but was led to believe that she could spend 
any lump sum she might receive without it affecting her children's 
eligibility. She relied to her detriment on her caseworker's 
silence, since had she known of the impending period of 
ineligibility, she would not have spent all of the lump sum but 
would have kept most of it for her children's needs. Under the 
circumstances, it would be a manifest injustice to not estop the 
state from repudiating its representation that Barrus' AFDC 
eligibility would not be affected by receipt of the DIB lump sum. 
Government functioning would not be impaired, since the state is in 
the best position to prevent such mistakes from occurring. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Overview of the AFDC Program 
The AFDC program is based on a scheme of cooperative 
federalism and is designed to provide financial assistance to 
8 
needy, dependent children and the parents or relatives who live 
with and care for them. Kino v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309f 316, 20 
L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968). A purpose of the AFDC statute, as expressed 
by Congress, is: 
...to help maintain and strengthen family life 
and to help such parents or relatives to 
attain or retain capability for the maximum 
self-support and personal independence 
consistent with the maintenance of continuing 
parental care and protection... 
42 U.S.C. § 601 (1991). A state that participates in the AFDC 
program is reimbursed by the federal government for a portion of 
the funds it expends. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1991). In return for 
receiving federal financial participation, the state must 
administer its AFDC program pursuant to a state plan that conforms 
to the applicable federal statutes and regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 
602 (1991). Children found eligible for AFDC are also eligible for 
health benefits under the Medicaid program. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(10)(A). States must consider a family's "income and 
resources" when determining whether or not it is needy. 42 U.S.C. 
S 602(a)(7)(A)(1991). A state may not provide AFDC benefits for 
any month in which a family's income exceeds a prescribed amount. 
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A)(1991). 
B. The Lump Sum Rule 
The AFDC lump sum rule at issue in this case was added by 
section 402(a) (17) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 
(OBRA). 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (17) (1991) . See Addendum for full 
statement of the statute. In sum, the lump sum rule applies when 
an AFDC family member receives in a month a lump sum of non-
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recurring income which, together with the family's other income, 
exceeds the state's standard of need for that family for that 
month. The lump sum rule applies to both earned and unearned 
income. The period of ineligibility is determined by dividing the 
amount of income received in the month by the standard of need for 
the household. Thus, in this case, the state divided $2226—the 
amount of DIB benefits Barrus received—by the standard of need for 
her household size—$810—resulting in her family becoming 
ineligible for three months. R-ll, 168. 
Since the lump sum rule is applied differently to DIB and SSI 
benefits, it is important to understand the difference between 
these two programs. A person seeking federal disability will 
frequently file for DIB under Title II of the Social Security Act 
(sections 216(i) and 223) 42 U.S.C. § 423 and for SSI under Title 
XVI of the Social Security Act (section 1614(a)(3)(A)) 42 U.S.C. § 
1382. A person who has worked and paid into the Social Security 
system is entitled to DIB, provided the disability has its onset 
during the time of insured status. A person who is not insured for 
DIB purposes, but is disabled, can be found eligible for SSI. 
Retroactive Social Security DIB benefits accrued during the 
pendency of a disability application are considered unearned 
income. The AFDC lump sum rule applies to DIB and if a member of 
an AFDC family receives retroactive DIB, the family will likely be 
ineligible for AFDC for a period of time. In contrast, the lump 
sum rule does not apply to a payment of retroactive SSI benefits, 
since the federal statute prohibits states from counting an SSI 
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recipient's income or resources as income to a family receiving 
AFDC or from considering the SSI recipient as a member of the AFDC 
family for determining AFDC eligibility. 42 U.S.C. § 
602(a)(24)(1991); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(x). When an AFDC family 
member receives an award of retroactive SSI, that member is simply 
excluded from the eligibility determination and the remaining 
members continue to be eligible for AFDC and Medicaid. 
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING A REPRESENTATION UPON 
WHICH BARRUS RELIED TO HER DETRIMENT 
A. Elements of Equitable Estoppel 
Estoppel is well-established in Utah case law as a doctrine of 
equity designed to give relief to a party who has been led to take 
a course of action and suffered some harm as a result of another 
party's representation that turns out to be false. This court has 
summarized the elements of estoppel as follows: 
(1) a statement, admission, act or failure to 
act by one party inconsistent with a claim 
later asserted; 
(2) reasonable action or inaction by the other 
party taken on the basis of the first party's 
statement, admission, act or failure to act; 
and 
(3) injury to the second party that would 
result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act. 
Eldridae v. Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 
App. 1990). It is clear that the first element may be established 
by proof of an express representation or by silence when a party 
ought to speak but does not, either intentionally or through 
culpable negligence. Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 
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697 (Utah 1976). An early decision summarized: 
It is generally held that in order for 
silence to work an estoppel, there must be a 
legal duty to speak, or there must be 
something willful or culpable in the silence 
which allows another to place himself in an 
unfavorable position by reason thereof. 
Utah State Building Comm. v. Great American Indemnity Co., 140 P.2d 
763, 772 (Utah 1943). 
When it reviewed Barrus' case at the trial de novo, the lower 
court failed to consider whether the first element of estoppel was 
met by caseworker Freestone's silence. The memorandum decision 
shows that the lower court focused solely on whether an express 
representation was made: 
The legal theory upon which the petitioner's 
claim is based is one of equitable estoppel. 
Under that doctrine she must prove that the 
statement was made, that she reasonably relied 
upon it, that an injury resulted, that 
manifest injustice would result if not 
remedied, and that the remedy would not impair 
the function of government. 
The failure of the petitioner's case is based 
upon the court's finding that the evidence 
failed to preponderate (let alone meet a 
standard of clear and convincing evidence as 
required by applicable case law) on the issue 
of whether or not the proported [sic] 
statement was made by Ms. Freestone (the AFDC 
caseworker). 
R-176. The lower court found: 
2) The basis of the petitioner's claim for 
payment from the state is a statement 
allegedly made to her by her caseworker that 
the social security payment would not affect 
her ongoing AFDC assistance. 
3) Petitioner's allegation is that, based 
upon the caseworker's representation, she 
spent the lump sum payment. She and her 
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children were injured by closure of her AFDC 
case. 
4) Petitioner probably asked about the effect 
of her SSI award lump sum, not recognizing the 
difference between such an award and the SSA 
award• 
5) The caseworker most likely responded 
correctly to a question about the SSI award's 
effect on petitioner's case, and could not 
have been reasonably expected to know that the 
award actually to be made was something 
different. 
R-179. 
The lower court erred in not finding that the first element of 
equitable estoppel was satisfied by the caseworker's silence in 
failing to apprise Barrus of how the receipt of a lump sum would 
affect her future eligibility. The caseworker had a responsibility 
to determine, and redetermine, eligibility for AFDC participants at 
the time Barrus first received notice of a possible future lump 
sum. The OFS policy and procedures manual provided, in relevant 
part: 
Eligibility Workers 
1. Roles: 
Determine eligibility for temporary and 
appropriate benefits accurately and 
timely; select from a wide variety of 
programs those necessary to support 
clients in their efforts to become self 
sufficient. 
2• Responsibilities 
B. Provide information so each client 
can make informed decisions. 
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C. Determine with the client which 
programs are applicable to her 
circumstances. 
• • • • 
F. Monitor and redetermine eligibility. 
G. Keep records which document 
eligibility and client's movement 
toward goals. 
3. Expectations 
A. Use all skills, information/ tools 
and resources available to assist 
the client. 
Utah-DHS-OFS Vol. II § 122. See Addendum. 
Barrus admits that the evidence does not support a finding 
that the caseworker made an express representation upon which she 
relied to her detriment. Although Barrus testified that after 
meeting with Freestone she understood that the receipt of a Social 
Security lump sum would not affect her children's AFDC eligibility. 
Freestone denied giving any advice to Barrus as to how the lump sum 
would affect her eligibility. R-209-12, 234. However, there is 
abundant evidence that Freestone remained silent when she 
reasonably could have determined what the effect of a lump sum 
would be on Barrus' eligibility. The caseworker had at least three 
opportunities to carry out her responsibility to "redetermine 
eligibility" and to provide Barrus with information so she could 
"make informed decisions." These include: 
1. Barrus' Initial Report of a Favorable Disability Decision 
There is no dispute that Barrus provided her caseworker with 
a letter, dated 25 April 1994, from G. Barrie Nielson, her legal 
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representative in the Social Security proceeding, advising that the 
ALJ who heard the Social Security case would be awarding benefits. 
R-164. There was nothing in state policy which would have 
prevented Freestone from contacting Nielson or Social Security to 
determine whether the lump sum would be DIB or SSI. R-250. 
Freestone did neither, choosing, instead, to remain silent until 
the lump sum arrived. Freestone's statement that, "We can't tell 
them how it will affect their case until the lump sum arrives" is 
simply wrong. R-246. Freestone admitted as much during cross-
examination: 
Q. Well, you could tell them the difference 
between SSI and DIB, couldn't you? 
A. We could. 
Q. And could you not tell them, as you just 
testified, that SSI does not affect the 
children's eligibility, but that DIB does? 
A. We could tell them that. 
Q. I mean, you wouldn't have to know the 
amount to give them that information, would 
you? 
A. No. 
R-246-47. At the very least, the state could have advised Barrus 
of the effect receipt of a DIB lump sum would have on her 
children's eligibility for AFDC; Barrus could have then used this 
information to decide whether she wished to spend the money as she 
did or hold it in reserve to meet her children's financial and 
medical needs• 
2. Barrus' Report of the Actual Favorable Disability Decision 
There is again no dispute that upon receiving the actual 
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favorable Social Security decision on her disability, Barrus 
immediately provided a copy to her caseworker. R-165, 231-32. The 
copy of the decision was date-stamped by the Ogden OFS on May 26, 
1994, long before the actual lump sum was received by Barrus. R-
165. Contained in the favorable decision is the following key 
paragraph: 
DECISION 
Based on the Title II application filed on May 
14, 1993, the claimant is entitled to a period 
of disability commencing February 15, 1993, 
and to disability insurance benefits under 
sections 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security 
Act, respectively, and the claimant's 
disability has continued at least through the 
date of this decision. 
R-166. Freestone testified that when she read the quoted paragraph 
in May 1994, it did not give her any indication of the type of 
benefits Barrus would be receiving. R-232. She assumed it meant 
Barrus had been approved for Social Security but did not consult 
with a supervisor or other workers. R-253. Most importantly, she 
remained silent and did nothing to advise Barrus that the Title II 
disability insurance benefits referred to in the decision were the 
type of lump sum that would likely disqualify her children from 
benefits. 
3. Barrus' Report of Her Award Letter 
Throughout her testimony, the caseworker maintained that she 
could not advise Barrus as to how a lump sum would affect her 
children's eligibility until Barrus received her award letter. R-
232-34. Barrus did bring in her award letter, dated June 23, 1994, 
as requested and it was date-stamped on June 28th or perhaps the 
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29th. R-233. The award letter states unequivocally that the lump 
sum would not be SSI benefits: 
Now we're writing to let you know that we're 
sending you the money we held back. This is 
because you didn't get SSI money for August 
1993 through May 1994. 
You'll get a check soon for $2,226.00, the 
amount you're due for August 1993 through May 
1994. 
R-169. Even with this information, Freestone still remained 
silent. Rather than advise Barrus that the soon-to-be-arriving DIB 
lump sum would render her children ineligible for June through 
August, Freestone sent Barrus a note, dated 30 June 1994, 
requesting more information. R-170. The note contains not a 
single reference to the fact that a DIB lump sum will disqualify 
Barrus's children for AFDC and Medicaid. Barrus responded but by 
then it was too late: the lump sum had been spent. Freestone's 
next communication with Barrus was to send her a Notice of 
Decision, dated 6 July 1994, telling her the bad news: 
Your financial medical assistance case will be 
closed July 31. This is because the money you 
received as a lump sum payment of $2226.00 
puts you over the income limit for your 
household size.... 
Your household will be ineligible for 
financial and medical assistance from June 1, 
1994 through August 31, 1994. 
R-168. By the time Freestone broke her silence, it was too late 
for Barrus to use the information to make an informed decision: she 
had already spent the lump sum. 
It is clear that despite the official policy quoted above 
placing the responsibility on the caseworker to "[p]rovide 
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information so each client can make informed decisions..." and to 
"monitor and redetermine eligibility..." the actual practice is to 
remain silent as to how a DIB lump sum will affect AFDC 
eligibility. Freestone's testimony shows that during the time 
period January through July 1994, she knew that DIB would affect 
Barrus' eligibility for AFDC, while an SSI lump sum would not, but 
she chose not to inform her of this. R-244-46. Instead, Freestone 
followed a policy of silence. When asked about her admitted 
knowledge regarding lump sums, she testified: 
Q. And did you discuss that with Christine 
Barrus at any time? 
A. No, not that I recall. 
Q, Why not? 
A. I didn't have — that's a very complex 
policy and generally we don't attempt to 
explain that to clients — until it's going to 
affect their case. 
Q. So you wait until the lump sum arrives 
and then try to sort it out; is that correct? 
A. We can't tell them how it will affect 
their case until the lump sum arrives. 
R-246. But in many cases, including Barrus', that is too late: the 
lump sum arrives and, absent knowledge of how future eligibility 
will be affected, is spent on outstanding bills and not kept to 
meet future needs. The caseworker's silence satisfies the first 
element for applying equitable estoppel in this case. 
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
A. Barrus Reasonably Relied on Her Caseworker's Silence 
It was reasonable for Barrus to rely upon her caseworker's 
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silence as a representation that receipt of the DIB lump sum would 
not affect her children's eligibility for AFDC. The record shows 
that she did everything she could to keep her caseworker informed 
about her pending disability claim. She met with her caseworker 
shortly after delivering a copy of her favorable decision but did 
not receive any clear information as to how her future eligibility 
would be affected. R-208-09. 
Shannon Freestone was in the best position to know whether 
Barrus' eligibility would be affected by a DIB lump sum. She was 
well-educated, having completed a bachelors degree and two years of 
graduate school. R-239. She had been trained and had read through 
the policy on lump sums. R-241. Freestone had a supervisor and 
other trained workers with whom she could consult, should she have 
difficulty understanding the application of policy. R-242. In 
contrast, Barrus had no training and did not even understand the 
difference between DIB and SSI at the time she applied for 
disability or later. R-198. Moreover, Barrus suffers from a 
disabling condition—systemic erythematosus lupus—and testified 
that it causes, among other things, confusion, depression and 
altered intellectual functioning. R-198-99, 223. Given these 
circumstances, it was reasonable for Barrus to rely on her 
caseworker to provide her with accurate information and advise her 
of the likely eligibility change. 
B. Barrus Suffered Harm as a Result of Her Caseworker's Silence 
Barrus and her family were living on a limited income at the 
time her benefits were terminated. The AFDC benefit for Barrus' 
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household was $654.00 plus food stamps. Her children needed 
medical assistance, including weekly counseling sessions costing 
$85 per session. R-201. Barrus' husband was not employed when she 
received notice of the termination and she had no other means of 
assistance while her case was closed. R-217. She does not have 
the means of repaying the overpaid benefits. R-218. Had she known 
that the DIB lump sum would make her children ineligible, Barrus 
would have acted differently. She testified: 
A. I would have paid the rent on our home 
and our utilities. I would have discussed 
with my mental health doing a sliding fee 
program to keep the children in their 
counseling, or set up a payment plan that I 
would still be able to carry them. 
Q. Would you have gone out and spent the 
money you described on a bed and tires and 
other bills? 
A. I may have still done the tires and 
insurance because we had to make the trip to 
Oregon. 
A. But as far as the bed and any household, 
a lot of bills can be put — 
Q. Would you have kept some of that money 
for your children's needs? 
A. Correct. 
R-220. In sum, although Barrus spent the lump sum on family 
necessities, she would have kept a portion of the lump sum for her 
children's financial and medical needs. Now she is faced with 
having to pay back the financial and medical assistance out of her 
limited monthly resources, a situation which will only make her 
family's living conditions worse. By her silence when she should 
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have spoken, Barrus's caseworker led her to believe that her 
family's eligibility for AFDC and Medicaid would not be affected by 
receipt of a DIB lump sum. The state should now be estopped from 
contradicting or repudiating its previous representation. 
C. Failure to Apply Estoppel Would Result in Injustice 
Although as a general rule equitable estoppel may not be 
invoked against governmental entities# there is an exception to 
this rule when: 
(1) it is necessary to prevent manifest 
injustice; and 
(2) the exercise of governmental powers will 
not be impaired as a result of the application 
of estoppel. 
Mendez v. State Dept. of Social Services, 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah 
App. 1991). The Court in Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 
P. 2d 715, 718, n. 4 (Utah 1982) observed that "courts are 
increasingly applying this exception, consistent with the trend 
toward holding government and its agencies more responsible for 
their actions." Utah cases which have applied this exception and 
found manifest injustice without any impairment of governmental 
powers include Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), wherein the Commission was 
estopped from denying a liquor license to an applicant who had 
relied on a letter advising that its club facility met statutory 
requirements. The Court emphasized that the petitioner had acted 
in good faith in relying on the state's representation. The same 
is true in this case, where Barrus dutifully reported to her 
caseworker every time there was a development in her disability 
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case. This court found the same good faith reliance in Eldridge v. 
Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d at 676, wherein a retiree 
received incorrect information regarding the terms of his 
retirement. The court observed that "the government should be 
scrupulously just in dealing with its citizens..." quoting from a 
Washington case: 
[W]here a public official, acting within his 
authority and with knowledge of the pertinent 
facts, has made a commitment and the party to 
whom it was made has acted to his detriment in 
reliance on that commitment, the official 
should not be permitted to revoke that 
commitment. 
State ex. rel. Shannon v. Sponburqh, 401 P.2d 635, 640 (Wash. 1965) 
quoted in Eldridge v. Utah State Retirement, 795 P.2d at 676. 
A more recent Washington state case which examined the 
applicability of equitable estoppel against a government agency in 
a context similar to that under review in this appeal is 
Kramarevckv v. State, DSHS, 822 P.2d 1227 (Wash. App. 1992), aff 'd 
863 P.2d 535 (1993). Kramarevcky received a four-month overpayment 
when he failed to report his income. The ALJ who heard the appeal 
found that Kramarevcky had followed all proper procedures and had 
no reason to believe his eligibility had ceased. The ALJ concluded 
all the elements of equitable estoppel had been met. In a related 
case consolidated with Kramarevcky, a different ALJ found equitable 
estoppel applied where Olivia Jinneman incurred an overpayment due 
to the state's error in continuing to provide her with AFDC and 
medical coupons after her son reached age 18 and was no longer in 
school. In both cases, the state was estopped from recouping the 
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overpayments. 
In finding manifest injustice in both cases, the court 
accepted the argument that the potential for manifest injustice 
must be evaluated in terms of the impact on the parties before them 
and not on the basis of possible unfairness to third persons not 
parties to the case. Kramarevcky v. State, 822 P.2d at 1233. 
Based on the fact that both Kramarevcky and Jinneman had provided 
timely and accurate information to the state, the overpayment 
stemmed from the state's error, there were no circumstances that 
might have alerted the recipients to the fact of the overpayment 
and both recipients lacked the resources to repay the debt without 
drawing on funds needed to meet their most basic needs, the court 
concluded: 
[I]t would be manifestly unjust to require 
persons with extremely limited resources and 
income to take on the added burden of repaying 
a debt incurred entirely without their 
knowledge and acquiescence, solely through the 
fault of the party against whom estoppel is 
sought. 
Kramarevcky v. State, DSHS, 822 P.2d at 1233. 
The reasoning of the Washington court applies with equal force 
in this case. Barrus provided timely and accurate information to 
her caseworker, starting in April 1994, from which the caseworker 
knew, or should have known, that Barrus would receive a 
disqualifying lump sum in the near future. The caseworker's excuse 
for not acting—that she needed to know the amount of the lump sum-
-is not acceptable. The caseworker needed only to know that the 
lump sum was DIB, which she could have learned by calling Social 
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Security. Even short of that information, she could have told 
Barrus that a DIB lump sum would disqualify her children and, 
therefore, when she received the lump sum to verify that it was, or 
was not, DIB before spending it. It is no excuse to say, as the 
caseworker maintained in her testimony, that the state does not 
tell recipients how to spend their money. Barrus did not need to 
be told how to spend her money; she needed only to be told how a 
DIB lump sum would affect her eligibility. 
The overpayment stemmed from the state's error. The 
caseworker was in the best position to understand how a DIB lump 
sum would affect Barrus' eligibility. It is reasonable for an AFDC 
recipient to infer that a state employee with graduate level 
education and several years of experience is competent to 
understand and communicate to her the difference between DIB and 
SSI and how a lump sum will affect AFDC eligibility. In fact, the 
caseworker did know the difference but chose not to say anything 
until after Barrus had received and spent the lump sum. Such a 
practice will inevitably result in overpayments, many of which are 
likely to go unrecovered. Those that are recouped from persons 
living at or near the poverty level can only add to the burden of 
poverty. 
There were no circumstances under which Barrus might have 
learned that her caseworker had not informed her properly 
concerning her future eligibility as the state's own policies 
required her to do. Barrus testified she did not understand the 
difference between the two programs—SSI and DIB. She made a good 
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faith effort to find out from her caseworker how her children would 
be affected but received either silence or misleading advice. 
Barrus is impaired in her intellectual functioning, was trying to 
deal with the added stress of caring for handicapped children and 
could not be expected to have discovered on her own that her 
children would be disqualified. 
Barrus does not have the resources to repay the debt without 
drawing on funds needed for basic needs. Barrus testified that she 
spent the lump sum on a bed, phone bills, car tires and insurance 
needed to make a trip to Oregon for a court appearance regarding 
the children. R-215. Her husband was unemployed and she did not 
have the means to repay the overpayment. R-218. Finally, like the 
Kramarevcky case, there is no evidence from which a reasonable 
inference can be drawn that Barrus sought to abuse the system. She 
testified she had never been charged with fraud or an intentional 
violation of the AFDC program and her consistent efforts to provide 
her caseworker with information regarding her disability evidences 
her sincerity. Given all those facts, it would be a manifest 
injustice to now allow the state to repudiate its representation 
and assert that she was overpaid. 
D. The Exercise of Governmental Powers Will Not be Impaired By 
the Application of Equitable Estoppel 
The court in Kramarevcky also addressed the issue of 
impairment of governmental functions issue. It noted the relevance 
of looking at public policy considerations in resolving the issue: 
We consider relevant to this inquiry which 
party could best have prevented the mistakes 
that occurred and who is in the best position 
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to assure that errors of this kind do not 
occur. 
Kramarevcky v. State. 822 P.2d at 1234. It concluded that the 
state could best have prevented the error and was in the better 
position to prevent future errors. It noted that the regulations 
do not place the burden of determining eligibility on the recipient 
and, 
when all information is accurately and timely 
provided by the recipient, it is appropriate 
to put the burden on the government to assess 
eligibility accurately in light of the 
information provided. 
Id. The functioning of the Washington DSHS would not be impaired, 
the court reasoned, because the application of estoppel would 
encourage it to "improve the accurate and orderly administration of 
the entitlements system. . ." since the state office was in the best 
position to review and revise its procedures to ensure that fewer 
mistakes would be made in the future. Id. 
This court should adopt the reasoning of Kramarevcky in 
addressing this element of applying equitable estoppel against the 
government. There is no dispute that Barrus provided accurate and 
timely information to her state caseworker. The caseworker should 
have been able to determine from that information that Barrus would 
be receiving a disqualifying lump sum. To refuse to apply estoppel 
would only encourage inefficient operation of the AFDC program, 
since caseworkers will continue to remain silent, when a simple 
explanation would avoid the creation of costly overpayments. The 
state is in the best position to prevent future overpayments of 
this type by properly training its caseworkers on how to advise 
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recipients such as Barrus who have been found eligible for Social 
Security disability benefits but do not know how that lump sum will 
affect their children's eligibility for AFDC and medical benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Barrus has satisfied all the elements of equitable estoppel. 
The record demonstrates that her caseworker remained silent and 
failed to comply with her duty to inform Barrus as to how her 
eligibility would be affected by a DIB lump sum. Barrus relied on 
that silence as a representation that she could spend the lump sum, 
which she did. It would now be a manifest injustice to allow the 
state to repudiate its representation that the lump sum would not 
affect her eligibility. Such a holding would not impair the 
functioning of the government but would encourage it to provide 
timely and accurate information to recipients. The court should 
reverse the lower court and enter a decision estopping the state 
from recovering any overpayment. 
DATED this ,%[ day of July, 19< 
r 
Lchael E. Bulson 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTINE L. BARRUS, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,; 
Respondent. ] 
l MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) Case No. 940900573 
This case had its origin with a closure of petitioner's Aid to Families 
With Dependant Children (AFDC) case for a period of two months based upon her 
receipt of a Social Security disability lump-sum payment. The court finds that the 
petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proof and is not entitled to the petitioned 
relief. 
The basis for the petitioner's claim for payment from the state, is a 
statement allegedly made to her by her case worker, that the social security payment 
would not affect her ongoing AFDC assistance. Her allegation is that based upon that 
representation she spent the lump sum payment. As a result, she and the children 
would suffer if deprived of the AFDC assistance. 
The legal theory upon which the petitioner's claim is based is one of 
equitable estoppel. Under that doctrine she must prove that the statement was made, 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 940900573 
Page 2 
that she reasonably relied upon it, that an injury resulted, that manifest injustice would 
result if not remedied, and that the remedy would not impair the function of 
government. 
The failure of the petitioner's case is based upon the court's finding that 
the evidence failed to preponderate (let alone meet a standard of clear and convincing 
evidence as required by applicable case law) on the issue of whether or not the 
proported statement was made by Ms. Freestone (the AFDC caseworker). 
I believe what may have happened was that the petitioner asked if her 
AFDC would be affected by a lump sum SSI award, not recognizing the difference 
between such an award and the SSA award that was actually made. A negative 
response to that inquiry would have been factually correct, and Ms. Freestone could 
not have been reasonably expected to know that the award actually to be made was 
something different. Furthermore, the doctrine of equitable estoppel would not require 
the caseworker to make an independent investigation to determine if the petitioner was 
asking the proper question. 
Would the State's attorney please prepare the necessary findings, 
conclusions and decree? 
DATED this 0 day of February, 1996. 
STANTON/M./TAYLOR, Judge 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 940900573 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the y ' day of February, 1996, I sent a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision as follows: 
Amy A. Jackson 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140835 
Salt Lake City, UT 84118-0835 
Michael E. Bulson 
Utah Legal Services 
Attorney for Defendant 
550 24th Street #300 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Deputy Court/Clerk 
AMY JACKSON #5724 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM #1231 
Attorney General 
P. 0. Box 140835 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0835 
Telephone: (801)538-9431 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
2549 WASHINGTON BLVD., OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
CHRISTINE L. BARRUS, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Department of Human Services, ] 
Respondent. 
\ FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 940900573 
1 Judge: Taylor 
This matter came on for trial on January 23, 1996, Michael Bulson, Utah Legal Services, 
representing Ms. Barrus, and Amy Jackson, Assistant Attorney General, representing the State of 
Utah. After reviewing the testimonies, evidence and briefs filed in the case, the court makes the 
following: 
(PL 
U 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1) This case originated with a closure of petitioner's AFDC case for a two-month period based 
upon her receipt of a Social Security disability lump sum payment. 
2) The basis of the petitioner's claim for payment from the state is a statement allegedly made 
to her by her caseworker that the social security payment would not affect her ongoing AFDC 
assistance. 
3) Petitioner's allegation is that, based upon the caseworker's representation, she spent the lump 
sum payment. She and her children were injured by closure of her AFDC case. 
4) Petitioner probably asked about the effect of her SSI award lump sum, not recognizing the 
difference between such an award and the SSA award. 
5) The caseworker most likely responded correctly to a question about the SSI award's effect 
on petitioner's AFDC case, and could not have been reasonably expected to know that the award 
actually to be made was something different. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
6) The legal theory upon which petitioner's claim is based is one of equitable estoppel. 
7) Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, petitioner must prove that the statement was made, 
that she reasonably relied upon it, that an injury resulted, that manifest injustice would result if the 
injury were not remedied, and that the remedy would not impair the function of government. 
2 
8) The evidence of whether or not the purported statement was made by the caseworker failed 
to meet the clear and convincing standard as required by applicable case law. 
9) The doctrine of equitable estoppel would not require the caseworker to make an independent 
investigation to determine if the petitioner was asking the proper question. 
10) Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proof and is not entitled to the relief prayed for 
in her complaint. 
Dated this day of , 199 . 
STANTON M. TAYLOR, Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the / £ day o^T^I^bc^^Uf \99J$fl mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions oi Law, postage prepaid to Michael 
E. Bulson, Utah Legal Services. 550 24th St. #300, Ogden, UT 84401. 
/ ^ 4 - ^ ^ ^ — ' 
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UTAH-DHS-OFS 
VOLUME II 
04-92 
BULLETIN OFS-11-92-04 
GENERAL PROVISIONS - THE ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS OF 
ELIGIBILITY WORKERS 
122Eliaibilitv Workers 
1. Roles: 
Determine eligibility for temporary and appropriate benefits accurately 
and timely; select from a wide variety of programs those necessary to 
support clients in their efforts to become self sufficient. 
2. Responsibilities 
A. Contact each client who applies. 
B. Provide information so each client can make informed decisions. 
C. Determine with the client which programs are applicable to her 
circumstances. 
D. Explore strategies for overcoming barriers and assist the client to 
obtain needed services. 
E. Make appropriate referrals to the self sufficiency worker and allied 
agencies. 
F. Monitor and redetermine eligibility. 
G. Keep records which document eligibility and clients' movement 
toward goals. 
H. Encourage and support appropriately. 
3. Expectations: 
A. Use all skills, information, tools and resources available to assist 
the client. 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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04-92 
BULLETIN OFS-11-92-04 
GENERAL PROVISIONS - THE ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS OF 
ELIGIBILITY WORKERS 
B. Refrain from assuming responsibilities which belong to the client. 
C. Foster clients' ownership of her self sufficiency pathway. 
D. Refrain from making moral or personal judgements. 
E. Observe the rights of the client - refer to Section 110 for rights 
of client. 
F. Safeguard information and protect confidentiality . 
G. Offer problem resolution opportunities. 
4. Rights: 
To keep professional and personal life separate. The professional 
worker is not expected to be the best friend of the clients. Rather 
the worker should be available to the clients in a professional setting. 
In that setting, the relationship with the clients will be a 
professional one. 
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UTAH-DHS-OFS 06-95 
VOLUME II BULLETIN OFS-ll-95-05 
INCOME STANDARDS - LUMP SUM PAYMENTS 
AND OTHER INCOME IN EXCESS OF STANDARD NEEDS BUDGET 
438 Lump Sum Payments and Other Income in Excess of Standard Needs Budget: 
Lump sum payments, including (but not limited to) Social Security lump sums, VA 
lump sums, unemployment compensation lump sums, and other one time payments 
such as lottery winnings, severance pay and personal injury and worker 
compensation awards, are considered lump sum income. Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) payments are NOT lump sum payments. Lump sums can be earned 
or unearned income. 
1. If the net lump sum* is less than the Standard Needs Budget Figure it is to 
be considered as income in the month received. Determine if it is countable 
income by using the Best Estimate income rules found in Section 430. Any 
remaining amount left the month following the month of receipt is considered 
an asset. 
2. If a household's net countable income (including the net lump sum* payment) 
exceeds the standard needs budget, then the amount in excess of the 
standard needs budget will count as income for future months. 
3. All members included in the assistant unit will be ineligible for assistance for 
the number of months determined by dividing the net countable income 
received in the payment month by the standard need budget amount equal 
to the assistant unit's size for the payment month. Any income remaining 
from this calculation is counted as income in the first month following the 
period of ineligibility. 
* Net lump sum: That portion of a lump sum left after excluding: 
1. Legal fees expended in the effort to make the lump sum available AND 
2. Payments for past medical bills AND 
3. Funeral or burial expenses, if the lump sum was intended to cover funeral or burial 
expenses. 
Continued on the next page 
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10-92 
BULLETIN OFS-ll-92-08 
INCOME STANDARDS - LUMP SUM PAYMENTS AND OTHER INCOME IN EXCESS 
OF STANDARD NEEDS BUDGET 
4. A net lump sum* payment that causes the net countable income to 
exceed the standard budget will result in the case closure following the 
procedures in Section 816 for a decrease in benefit. The ineligible period 
for the household will begin the month the lumpsum is received. If due 
to the 10 day notice requirement, a payment is made the month of 
receipt or after the month of receipt of the lump sum, an overpayment 
has occurred. 
EXAMPLE: 
Ms. A has net countable income of $50.00 received in January. In 
January she also received a lump sum of $2,750. 
She has a household of two with a standard budget of $431 . Determine 
her period of ineligibility by adding the $50.00 net countable income to 
the lump sum of $2,750. This equals $2,800. 
Divide $2,800 by the standard budget amount of $431.00. $431 will 
go into $2,800 six full times with a remainder of $214. 
Close the AFDC case at the end of January providing that you can give 
adequate notice. If payment must be made in February, write an 
overpayment for both January and February. The client is ineligible for 
six months beginning wi th January and ending wi th June. If the client 
reapplies in July, then the remainder of $214 will be added to any July 
income she may have to determine eligibility for July and the initial grant 
for July. 
5. A lump sum, in an amount greater than the standard budget, received 
before the date of application in the month of application, will result in 
the application being denied and a period of ineligibility being determined. 
If the case is ineligible, and the application is denied, then the month of 
application is the first month in the period of ineligibility. 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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VOLUME II 
09-92 
BULLETIN OFS-ll-92-06 
INCOME STANDARDS - LUMP SUM PAYMENTS AND OTHER INCOME IN EXCESS 
OF STANDARD NEEDS BUDGET 
6. A lump sum, in an amount greater than the standard budget, received 
after the date of application in the month of application, will result in the 
case being closed effective the last day of the month of application. If 
payment must be made the next month, an overpayment for the 
application month and the next month has occurred. 
7. Do not count a lump sum received before the month of application. 
8. A lump sum received after the month of closure shall not be counted nor 
can it be used to extend the period of ineligibility. 
9. Treat new household members as a separate assistance unit if they meet 
the 2 rules below: 
A. The new member is born or moves into the home after the lump 
sum is received. 
AND 
B. The new member was not included as part of the SNB used to 
figure the period of ineligibility. 
Do not use the lump sum income when determining eligibility and grant 
amount. Use all other household income. Include the income of 
household members who are not eligible due to the receipt of the lump 
sum. 
The lump sum funds are not an asset for the new members. But, all other 
household assets must be considered. 
Use the figures from Table II for the number of new household members to 
determine eligibility and the amount of payment. For example, if a child is born 
after the period of ineligibility is calculated, base the grant for that child on a 
household size of 1. 
Beginning the month following the last month of ineligibility, aH family members 
must be in one household. This rule applies even if there is an amount 
remaining from the lump sum that is used as income. 
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438-1 Shortening the Period of Ineligibility 
1. The period of ineligibility can be shortened only if one of 
the following occurs. 
A. The State increases the Standard Needs Budget. 
B. The household incurs, becomes responsible for, and pays 
medical expenses that are not covered by private insurance. 
Only the following medical expenses can be used: 
(1) Any expense that would be covered by the Medicaid 
Program but is not because the household member 
is not eligible for that program (see Table III, 
Vol. Ill-F). 
(2) Any Chiropractic Service, Naturopathic Service, or 
Pain Clinic Service. 
(3) Any paid prescriptions. 
(4) Co-payments made by Medicaid recipients for 
improper use of emergency room services. 
C. A disaster occurs that results in the lump sum becoming 
unavailable to the household for reasons beyond their 
control. Examples include earthquake, fire, flood, robbery, 
etc. The following conditions must be met: 
(1) The lump sum has been or will be spent in 
connection with the disaster. 
(Continued on next page) 
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(2) Until the disaster occurred, the lump sum was used 
to provide food, clothing, or shelter. 
(3) The household has no other income or resources 
sufficient to meet the expenses of the disaster. 
The Regional Director or his designee must determine when a 
disaster has occurred. Document the decision in the following 
way: 
A. The Regional Director or his designee must write the 
decision on Form 689. 
B. File the original copy of the 689 and all supporting 
evidence in the case record. 
C. Send a copy of the 689 and all the supporting evidence to 
the Director of the Office of Family Support. 
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438-2 How to Recalculate the Period of Ineligibility 
1. If there is a change in the standard needs budget (SNB), 
recalculate the period of ineligibility in the following way: 
A. Determine the amount of the lump sum that remains. 
Do this in the following manner: 
(1) Multiply the old SNB by the number of months 
the case has already been ineligible due to the 
receipt of the lump sum. 
(2) Subtract this amount from the original net 
countable income. This is the amount 
remaining. 
B. Divide the amount remaining by the new SNB. this 
is the number of months the household will remain 
ineligible. Any amount left over will only count for 
the month following the last month of ineligibility. 
2. If the period of ineligibility is short need for any reason 
other than a change in the SNB, calculate the new period 
eof ineligibility in the following way: 
A. Multiply the SNB by the number of months the cas? 
has already been ineligible due to the receipt of the 
lump sum. 
B. Add the figure obtained in "a" to the amount paid for 
medical expenses or lost due to a disaster. 
(Continued on next page) 
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C. Subtract the amount obtained in "b" from the 
original net countable income. This is the amount 
remaining. 
D. If the amount remaining is zero, the soonest the 
household is eligible is the date of the new 
application. 
B. If the amount remaining is greater than zero but less 
than the SNB, the soonest the household is eligible 
is the date of the new application. The amount 
remaining must be considered as income in the 
month following the last month of ineligibility. 
F. If the amount remaining is greater than the SNB, 
divide that amount by the SNB. This is the number 
of months the household is ineligible. Any amount 
remaining must count for the month following the 
last month of ineligibility. 
EXAMPLE: 
In January the Jones household receives a lump sum 
of $4100. The SNB is $400. If the ineligibility 
period is not shortened, the Jones household will be 
ineligible for 10 months, March through December. 
However, in April Mr. Jones is hospitalized, and in 
May he pays a $2000 hospital bill. The period of 
ineligibility should be shortened. This is done by 
following the steps below: 
A. Multiply SNB by 3. 
$ 4 0 0 X 3 = $1200 
(Continued on next page) 
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B. Add the $1200 to the medical bill that has 
been paid. 
$1200 + $2000 = $3200 
C. Subtract the $3200 from the amount of the 
original lump sum. 
$4100 - $3200 = $900 
D. Divide the $900 by the SNB. 
$900 - $400= 2 with $100 left over. 
The Jones household is ineligible for 2 more 
months. They can apply again in August. 
The $100 will be income for August. 
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438-3 Lump Sums from Any Source Paid for an SSI Recipient in an 
AFDC Household 
Do not count the lump sum for an SSI recipient as either income 
or resources. 
438-3 
except that the State may select categories of recipients who 
may report at specified less frequent intervals; and 
(B) that, in addition to whatever action may be appropriate 
based on other reports or information received by the State 
agency, the State agency will take prompt action to adjust the 
amount of assistance payable, as may be appropriate, on the 
basis of the information contained in the report (or upon the 
failure of the family to furnish a timely report), and will give 
an appropriate explanatory notice, concurrent with its action, 
to the family; 
(15) provide (A) for the development of a program, for each 
appropriate relative and dependent child receiving aid under 
the plan and for each appropriate individual (living in the same 
home as a relative and child receiving such aid) whose needs 
are taken into account in making the determination under 
paragraph (7), for preventing or reducing the incidence of 
births out of wedlock and otherwise strengthening family life, 
and for implementing such program by assuring that in all 
appropriate cases (including minors who can be considered to 
be sexually active) family planning services are offered to them 
and are provided promptly (directly or under arrangements 
with others) to all individuals voluntarily requesting such ser-
vices, but acceptance of family planning services provided un-
der the plan shall be voluntary on the part of such members 
and individuals and shall not be a prerequisite to eligibility for 
or the receipt of any other service under the plan; and (B) to 
the extent that services provided under this paragraph are 
furnished by the staff of the State agency or the local agency 
administering the State plan in each of the political subdivi-
sions of the State, for the establishment of a single organiza-
tional unit in such State or local agency, as the case may be, 
responsible for the furnishing of such services; 
(16) provide that the State agency will— 
(A) report to an appropriate agency or official, known or 
suspected instances of physical or mental injury, sexual 
abuse or exploitation, or negligent treatment or maltreat-
ment of a child receiving aid under this part under circum-
stances which indicate that the child's health or welfare is 
threatened thereby; and 
(B) provide such information with respect to a situation 
described in subparagraph (A) as the State agency may 
have; 
(17) provide that if a child or relative applying for or receiv-
ing aid to families with dependent children, or any other 
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person whose need the State considers wnen determining m^ 
income of a family, receives in any month an amount of earned 
or unearned income which, together with all other income for 
that month not excluded under paragraph (8), exceeds the 
State's standard of need, applicable to the family of which he is 
a member— 
(A) such amount of income shall be considered income 
to such individual in the month received, and the family of 
which such person is a member shall be ineligible for aid 
under the plan for the whole number of months that equals 
(i) the sum of such amount and all other income received 
in such month, not excluded under paragraph (8), divided 
by (ii) the standard of need applicable to such family, and 
(B) any income remaining (which amount is less than 
the applicable monthly standard) shall be treated as income 
received in the first month following the period of ineligi-
bility specified in subparagraph (A); 
except that the State may at its option recalculate the period of 
ineligibility otherwise determined under subparagraph (A) (but 
only with respect to the remaining months in such period) in 
any one or more of the following cases: (i) an event occurs 
which, had the family been receiving aid under the State plan 
for the month of the occurrence, would result in a change in 
the amount of aid payable for such month under the plan, or 
(ii) the income received has become unavailable to the mem-
bers of the family for reasons that were beyond the control of 
such members, or (iii) the family incurs, becomes responsible 
for, and pays medical expenses (as allowed by the State) in a 
month of ineligibility determined under subparagraph (A) 
(which expenses may be considered as an offset against the 
amount of income received in the first month of such ineligibil-
ity); 
(18) provide that no family shall be eligible for aid under the 
plan for any month if, for that month, the total income of the 
family (other than payments under the plan), without applica-
tion of paragraph (8), other than paragraph (8)(A)(v) or 
(8 2)(A)(viii), exceeds 185 percent of the State's standard of need 
for a family of the same composition, except that in determin-
ing the total income of the family the State may exclude any 
earned income of a dependent child who is a full-time student, 
in such amounts and for such period of time (not to exceed 6 
months) as the State may determine; 
(19) provide— 
745 
